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Executive Summary 
During the nineties, there has been a strong increase in the number of firms whose earnings 
consistently met or exceeded analyst consensus forecasts. Positive earnings surprises can be 
achieved through two principal mechanisms. First,  through  accounting-based manipulations and 
discretianary accruals,  executives may manage earnings in order to  avoid falling short of analyst 
expectations. The second method is to inject pessimism in analyst forecasts by providing analysts 
with negative clues leading to downward revisions of their earnings per share estimates. Managers 
can use numerous mechanisms to achieve this goal. Executives can use public disclosures (e.g. profit 
warnings), non-formal communications with analysts or pressure on analysts to adjust their forecasts 
away from their true beliefs.  
Another striking development over the last decade has been the strong increase in stock-based 
and option-based executive compensation. Executives’ personal financial wealth has become more 
directly tied to the stock price performance of their firms. This has led to an increase in managers’ 
potential incentives to affect the share price of their companies.  
In this paper, we show that CEO compensation packages  provide managers with strong 
incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises by managing analyst expectations downward. We first 
analyze those components of CEO compensation contracts together with stock and option 
ownership, that most influence the extent of analyst guidance, taking into account other firm-specific 
factors. Consistent with common wisdom, we report a strong positive relationship between the 
practice of analyst guidance and the value of the CEO’s in-the-money exercisable options as well as 
one between the sensitivity of the option portfolios to stock price movements and analyst guidance. 
Moreover, we document a positive relationship between the value of shares held by CEOs and 
analyst guidance. Furthermore, there is a strong positive relationship between analyst guidance and 
the bonuses paid annually to CEOs, which suggests that meeting or beating analyst expectations 
constitutes an important determinant of CEO performance assessment. Finally, we document a 
negative link between CEO base salary and analyst guidance. 
In a second set of investigations, we examine the extent to which the stock market is able to 
discern any pessimistic bias in analyst consensus forecasts induced by expectations management   3
strategies. We conduct an event study around the earnings announcement dates to measure the 
valuation effects caused by expectations management strategies and we test whether these effects are 
related to the factors that explain analyst guidance. Consistent with prior research, we find that firms 
that meet or beat analyst consensus forecasts display strong positive cumulative abnormal returns 
during the period surrounding the announcement date. However, for these firms, the market is 
partially able to discern analyst guidance strategies: companies that are suspected of managing 
analyst expectations in order to report a positive earnings surprise display a lower abnormal return at 
the earnings announcement than those not suspected of guiding analysts downward. Further analysis 
establishes that this lower abnormal return is significantly and positively related to the options held by 
CEOs. 
Overall, our results imply that tying executives’ incentives too strongly to stock price produces 
the perverse effect of encouraging CEOs to manipulate analysts expectations, such that performance 
dependent CEO compensation is maximized over the short run. However, the good news is that the 
market is partially able to detect the games played by executives.    4
Executive Compensation and Analyst Guidance: The Link between CEO 
Pay and Expectations Management 
   
Abstract 
During the last decade, a surprisingly high percentage of U.S. companies has fulfilled or beaten 
analysts’ earnings per share forecasts. One of the most frequently cited reasons for this growing 
tendency is a change in the nature of U.S. executive compensation structure. As stock options have 
become an increasingly important part of executive compensation, the preservation or enhancement 
of short term stock value around the earnings announcement has become a priority for managers. 
Besides earnings management, a widespread way to meet analyst expectations is to inject pessimism 
into their forecasts by providing analysts with negative clues, or so-called downward guidance. This 
paper is the first to investigate the relationship between the practice of analyst guidance and executive 
compensation packages. We document a strong link between expectations management and the 
relevant options component of CEO compensation, bonus plan payments, and the value of the firm's 
shares owned by its managing CEO. In a second set of tests, we show that firms that meet or beat 
analyst forecasts at the earnings announcement generate positive abnormal returns, which are 
significantly lower for firms suspected of managing expectations. 
 
JEL classification: G14; G24; M52 
Keywords: Analyst guidance, Earnings surprise, Executive compensation, Stock options 
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1  Introduction 
Over the last decade, companies have tried particularly hard to meet analyst expectations. There 
has been a strong decrease in the tendency of managers to report earnings falling short of analyst 
estimates (see for example Brown 2001a). Reporting earnings that do not fall short of analyst 
expectations can be achieved by two principal mechanisms. First, through the manipulation of 
discretionary accruals, executives are able to manage earnings in order to meet or beat analyst 
expectations. The second method is to inject pessimism into analyst forecasts by providing analysts 
with negative clues leading to downward revisions of the consensus estimates. As a result, firms can 
more easily meet or beat analyst expectations. The business press is replete with articles referring to 
this practice. In a December 1998 Fortune Magazine article entitled “The Guidance Game”, E. 
Schonfeld writes: 
“… a company is allowed to provide the analysts with clues, or so-called 
guidance, about what it thinks earnings will be. The guidance number usually 
shows up as the consensus estimate among analysts. If the company meets or just 
beats the consensus, both that company and the analyst win: The stock goes up 
and everyone looks smart.” 
Fuller and Jensen (2002) attribute the increasing tendency of managers engaging in analyst 
manipulation strategies to a shift in the nature of executive compensation structure. As stock options 
have become an increasingly important component of executive compensation, the preservation or 
enhancement of short term stock value around the earnings announcement has become a priority for 
managers. In the Business Week edition of May 24, 1998, M. Vickers corroborates this 
explanation: 
“Companies need to generate positive surprises to keep not only stockholders 
but also stock-option holders happy – and that group is growing…” 
In this paper, we investigate whether the tendency of executives to manage analyst forecasts 
downward is related to the incentives provided by their compensation packages. Although past 
research and financial media have claimed that executives’ expectations management practices are   6
due to the increasing dependence of their compensation on the evolution of short term stock prices, 
to date no direct empirical tests of this relationship have been performed, taking explicitly into 
account the degree and nature of management’s compensation and ownership exposure to their 
firm’s stock performance. 
We conduct two distinct sets of tests. First, we analyze those components of CEO 
compensation contracts together with stock and option ownership, that most influence the extent of 
analyst guidance, taking into account other firm-specific factors. We tackle this problem by 
considering the characteristic components of the CEO compensation package due to their differing 
risk and incentive profiles. We find that CEO compensation components strongly influence the 
propensity of managers to engage in expectations management strategies. Consistent with common 
wisdom, we report a strong positive relationship between the practice of analyst guidance and the 
value of the CEO’s in-the-money exercisable options as well as one between the sensitivity of the 
option portfolios to stock price movements and analyst guidance. Moreover, we document a positive 
relationship between the value of shares held by CEOs and analyst guidance. Furthermore, there is a 
strong positive relationship between analyst guidance and the bonuses paid annually to CEOs 
suggesting that meeting or beating analyst expectations constitutes an important determinant of CEO 
performance assessment. Finally, we document a negative link between CEO base salary and analyst 
guidance.  
Second, we examine the extent to which the stock market is able to discern any pessimistic bias 
in analyst consensus forecasts induced by expectations management strategies. We conduct an event 
study around the earnings announcement dates to measure the valuation effects induced by 
expectations management strategies and we investigate whether these valuation effects are related to 
the factors that explain the extent of analyst guidance. Similar to previous research, we find that firms 
that meet or beat analyst consensus forecasts display strong positive cumulative abnormal returns 
during the period surrounding the announcement date. However, for these firms, the market is 
partially able to discern analyst guidance strategies: companies that are suspected of managing 
analyst expectations in order to report a positive earnings surprise display a lower abnormal return at 
the earnings announcement than those not suspected of guiding analysts downward. Further analysis 
establishes that this lower abnormal return is significantly and positively related to the options held by 
the CEOs.    7
Our research makes several contributions to the extant literature. To our knowledge, we are the 
first to demonstrate the crucial role of executive compensation in explaining analyst guidance. By 
finding that equity-based compensation induces managers to manipulate analysts, we complement 
previous research underlining negative consequences of equity-based compensation (cf. Dechow et 
al. 1996 for instance). Secondly, we extend Matsumoto’s (2002) analysis in which she documents 
that specific firm characteristics explain managerial incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises, 
although without including the incentives created by executive compensation components. Thirdly, 
we complement the study of Richardson et al. (2003) which shows that the tendency of managers 
and firms to sell shares after the earnings announcement creates incentives to guide analyst forecasts 
downward. Our paper considers the CEO’s full pay package with several additional compensation 
and ownership items. We identify which equity and accounting performance-based compensation 
components lead managers to manipulate analyst expectations downward. We also extend the 
results of Aboody and Kasznik (2000), who find that executives manipulate analyst expectations by 
rushing bad news reports in order to decrease the strike prices of their awarded options. While they 
consider only the impact of newly awarded options as incentives to manipulate analyst expectations 
we take into account explicitly the impact of all past and current equity-based compensation 
components. Finally, our study contributes to the earnings surprise literature by demonstrating that 
positive cumulative abnormal returns for firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts are smaller if the 
firms are likely to achieve this through expectations management. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Bartov et al. (2002), who use a different method to measure expectations management.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature related 
to expectations management. In Section 3, we develop hypotheses concerning the cross-sectional 
relationship between expectations management and CEO compensation components as well as CEO 
stock and option ownership. Section 4 presents the sample and the empirical design. Results are 
provided in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
2  Literature review 
Three important conclusions for expectations management stand out from past research. First, 
reported earnings impact stock prices. Bartov et al. (2002) document that stocks of firms that meet 
or beat analyst forecasts command a significantly higher return at the announcement date than those   8
with unfavorable surprises. Furthermore, they find that the cost of managing analyst expectations 
downward before the announcement date, is more than compensated by the stock price reaction to 
positive earnings surprises at the announcement date. More specifically, controlling for the magnitude 
of the revision and the surprise, the stock price response to surprises at the earnings announcement is 
1.5 times stronger than the response to analysts’ downward revisions before the announcement date 
in their sample. Lopez and Rees (2001) report that firms that meet or beat analyst estimates over 
multiple subsequent quarters experience positive cumulative abnormal returns on the announcement 
date. Similarly, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) document that subsequent earnings and subsequent 
market values are higher for firms reporting positive earnings surprises over multiple consecutive 
quarters. Moreover, Skinner and Sloan (2002)  document that firms reporting negative surprises 
suffer large asymmetric market reactions compared to those reporting positive surprises; this applies 
in particular to growth firms.  
Second, management is concerned about the evolution of short term stock p rices for several 
reasons. As underlined by Richardson et al. (2003), managers of companies that intend to issue new 
equity are preoccupied with the current price level of their company as it directly impacts the amount 
of capital raised in the issue. Since many equity issues occur in the period following the public 
earnings announcement, a sharp price increase at the earnings release is particularly important for the 
success of such issues. Richardson et al. find that forecast pessimism prior to an earnings 
announcement is more common for firms that are about to issue new equity.  
The structure of management compensation packages is another reason why executives care 
about their firms’ near term stock prices. Murphy (1999) documents a strong increase in option 
compensation for U.S. CEOs between 1991 and 1996 across all industrial sectors. He also reports 
a strong increase in the value of stocks held by S&P 500 CEOs over the nineties. Yermack (1997) 
examines CEO timing ability with respect to corporate news announcements and finds that CEOs 
receive stock option awards in advance of good earnings news boosting stock prices. By the same 
token, earnings announcements before CEO stock option awards are less favorable on average. 
Yermack concludes that CEOs exert i nfluence on the compensation committee and are therefore 
able to manage the timing of their awards. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that CEOs make 
opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that increase the value of their stock option 
compensation. In particular, they investigate the timing of voluntary disclosures around option awards   9
to the CEOs of firms with fixed award schedules, and find that managers of such firms manage 
investor expectations downward prior to the award date, by delaying good news and rushing 
forward bad news. Richardson et al. (2003) show that analyst forecasts are more pessimistic for 
firms whose insiders are net sellers of the firm’s stock in the period following earnings announcement. 
Managers may as well be concerned that a negative earnings surprise will affect their 
performance evaluation. Matsunaga and Park (2001) document a significant negative effect on the 
CEO’s bonus payment when reported earnings fall short of analyst expectations. Puffer and 
Weintrop (1991) find an increased probability of CEO turnover when earnings fall short of analyst 
expectations. In the same vein, Matsumoto (2002) finds that managers of firms with high institutional 
ownership are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. She attributes her 
finding to the pressure for near-term performance characterizing institutional investors. Moreover, 
she finds that firms relying on implicit claims with stakeholders and companies in industries with high 
litigation risk are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
Finally, prior research concludes that managers have the ability to manage analyst forecasts. This 
is achieved by using numerous mechanisms, including public disclosures (Cotter et al. 2002), non-
formal communications or by pressure on analysts to adjust their forecasts away from their actual 
expectations. A crucial input to the analyst is timely access to new information about the covered 
companies and, most of the time, this information is obtained from the  companies themselves. 
Consequently, analysts have to cooperate with firms to achieve less restricted access to company 
management (Boni and Womack 2002). Lim (2001) argues that analysts rationally issue biased 
forecasts in order to obtain valuable future information from management, which is one of their key 
sources of information. To the extent that the analyst’s employer holds large positions or maintains an 
investment banking relationship with the company covered, the analyst is likely subject to additional 
pressures regarding his forecasts. Michaely and Womack (1999) and Lin and McNichols (1998) 
document a systematic bias in recommendations for companies underwritten by the analyst’s 
institution.  
Overall, past research concludes that there is a strong relationship between the sign of the 
earnings surprise and the stock price reaction at the earnings announcement, that managers have 
strong incentives to avoid negative surprises, and that they have the possibility to manage analysts   10
through various information channels or by exerting pressure on analysts to issue forecasts that are 
compatible with managements’ own objectives.  
3  Hypotheses on expectations management and executive compensation 
In this section, we provide a description of the components that constitute most executive 
compensation packages (Murphy 1999): stocks, stock options, bonus payments, long-term incentive 
plans, and base salary. For each compensation component we discuss the incentives that are created 
for managers to manipulate analysts prior to the earnings announcement. We form hypotheses about 
the relationship between expectations management and these compensation components as an 
integral part of the CEO’s total firm-related financial exposure.  
We define expectations management as the tendency of firm managements to avoid negative 
earnings surprises by maintaining low analyst expectations. Expectations management is measured by 
comparing the analyst consensus forecast and the expected earnings forecast according to the model 
described in section 4.2.
3 
We use two measures of the CEO’s stock compensation and share ownership in order to 
examine their influence on expectations management: (1) restricted stocks granted to the CEO during 
the current fiscal year and (2) the CEO’s total stock position.  
Restricted stocks are “restricted” because shares are forfeited under certain conditions typically 
related to employment retention. Their sale is usually prohibited during a three to five year vesting 
period. The CEO’s total stock position includes in addition stocks acquired by the CEO privately 
and restricted stocks granted during previous years. 
Risk averse and liquidity constrained managers tend to sell a large portion of their shares as 
quickly as possible for liquidity or diversification reasons, at times aiming for personal target levels of 
share ownership (Ofek and Yermack 2000). However, due to the insider trading restrictions on the 
US market these sales typically do not occur before the earnings announcement: the bulk of insider 
trades i s concentrated in the week immediately following (Sivakumar and Waymire 1994). 
Consequently, equity-based compensation components provide executives with strong incentives to 
take actions which lead to a share price increase around the earnings announcement date. Moreover, 
                                                                   
3 We use the terms expectations management and analyst guidance synonymously in this paper.   11
executives benefit from a relatively pessimistic outlook during a fiscal year in which stocks are 
awarded or purchased. By saving good news for the earnings announcement (taking place in the first 
quarter of the next fiscal year), managers will receive a larger number of shares at times when share 
price is low. 
Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the total values of CEO share positions and 
expectations management. We also expect a positive relationship between restricted stocks awarded 
to managers and analyst guidance. However, this relation might be weaker than that of analyst 
guidance to the total position of unrestricted stocks, as our data contains the restricted stocks 
granted in the current fiscal year only, which are likely not at the CEO’s free disposal yet.
4 This leads 
to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the value of the shares held by CEOs 
and expectations management. 
Stock options provide a direct, albeit non-linear, link between share price appreciation and 
managerial rewards. Options-based incentives to manipulate analysts’ expectations may stem from 
two distinct sources: (1) newly awarded stock options, and (2) unexercised stock options granted in 
previous years. 
Newly awarded stock options are usually non-tradable and are typically forfeited if the executive 
leaves the firm before vesting. Murphy (1999) documents that most options expire after ten years, 
gradually become vested during approximately four years, and are granted with strike prices equal to 
the “fair market value” on the date of the grant. Despite trading restrictions, there are three reasons 
why newly awarded stock options can encourage executives to manage analyst expectations 
downward. First, a low stock price in the year of the option grant will translate into a relatively low 
strike, thus increasing the future value of the CEO’s grant after the positive surprise at the earnings 
announcement (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Second, newly awarded options increase executives’ 
risk exposures to their companies. CEOs may thus have an interest to sell non-restricted shares or 
exercise options to hedge the additional risk created by the newly awarded options (Ofek and 
Yermack 2000). Finally, compared to out-of-the-money options, the value of newly awarded at-
the-money options is more sensitive to stock price changes. As a consequence, chief-level   12
executives aiming to maximize their yearly stock option compensation may pursue stock price 
enhancing strategies for behavioral reasons.  
In contrast to newly awarded options, exercisable and in-the-money options granted to CEOs 
during prior years can be cashed in directly after the earnings announcement. The amount of cash 
that can be raised by exercising the option and reselling the shares immediately is linearly related to 
the share price. As a consequence, CEOs owning considerable positions of exercisable and in the 
money options will have strong incentives to push strategies leading to share price increases. Overall, 
we expect executives with large positions of newly awarded and exercisable in-the-money options to 
have strong incentives to guide analysts. Hence the second hypothesis states the following: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between expectations management and the value 
of the options held by the CEO. 
Bonus plans awarded to top executives are generally based on a single-year performance 
measure. Murphy (1999) reports that most companies use two or more performance measures to 
pay the annual bonus to top executives and almost all companies rely on some measure of accounting 
profits to assess performance. Previous research suggests two reasons why bonus may be related to 
expectations management. First, the size of the annual bonus is positively related to the success of 
meeting analyst forecasts (Matsunaga and Park 2001). Therefore, managers receiving bonus plan 
payments benefit directly from meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts. Second, analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are reflected in the board of directors’ expectations about future performance of 
their organizations (Imhoff and Lobo 1984, Fuller and Jensen 2002). Consequently, executives have 
a strong interest to keep the directors’ expectations moderate (via analyst forecasts) in order to set 
performance thresholds for their bonus plans relatively low. Accordingly our third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3 : The relationship between expectations management and the amount paid to 
CEOs according to annual bonus plans is positive. 
The structure of typical long-term incentive plans is similar to the structure of bonus plans, with 
the exception that long-term incentive plans are typically based on rolling-averages of three or five-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
4 The detailed description of the compensation variables is contained in Section 4.3.   13
year cumulative performance. Hence, managers can similarly benefit f rom a relatively pessimistic 
outlook during the year and a positive surprise at the announcement. As a consequence, we expect 
the relationship between long-term incentive plans and expectations management to be similar to the 
relationship between bonus plans and expectations management. This leads to our fourth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 : The relationship between expectations management and the amount paid to 
CEOs according to long-term incentive plans is positive.  
Base salary represents the fixed component in executive compensation contracts. Salaries are 
typically based on general industry salary surveys, supplemented by detailed analysis of selected 
industry peers. In contrast to the other compensation items described above, the total amount of 
salary paid to a CEO in a given fiscal year is independent of the company’s accounting performance 
or stock price development of that same year. Therefore, it unlikely creates any incentives for the 
CEO to engage in expectations management. To the contrary, CEOs with high salaries might be less 
likely to manage expectations for two reasons. 
First, for any given level of performance-linked compensation items, the higher the CEO’s base 
salary, the less likely the liquidity constraints that might force the CEO to cash in any performance 
dependent compensation items. Hence, the CEO is less likely induced to take short term actions in 
order to increase the value of the positions to be cashed in. 
Second, expectations management might be costly in the sense that it increases  the risk of 
shareholder litigation in response to stock price manipulation. Investors might equally discount stock 
prices of firms once they have been identified to manipulate analysts. Thus, if expectations 
management jeopardizes firm reputation and management’s credibility, it could ultimately result in the 
loss of the CEO’s job, which would be particularly costly for CEOs with high base salaries at stake. 
These arguments lead to our fifth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5 : The relationship between the salaries paid to CEOs and expectations 
management is negative.   14
4  Sample and methodology 
In this section, we first describe our sample selection process. Then, we present the measurement of 
the variables used in this paper and report their summary statistics. Finally, we describe the 
methodology used to test our hypotheses.  
4.1  Sample selection 
We use data from five sources. The CEO compensation information is taken from Standard and 
Poor’s Execucomp database. Execucomp reports components of executive compensation for 
approximately 1500 U.S. firms (S&P 500, S&P 400 Mid Cap, S&P 600 Small Cap) between 
1992 and 2001. Similar to Richardson et al. (2003), we use individual analysts’ forecasts to 
calculate a customized consensus estimate. With this approach, we are able to construct a measure 
of expectations that is more timely than the I/BE/S monthly consensus mean, which may contain stale 
forecasts.
5 We compute the monthly consensus forecast for each company using the median of all 
individual analyst forecasts in that month. The individual analysts' annual earnings forecasts are 
obtained from Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S Detail History database. Accounting data is taken from 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat. Daily stock returns and market capitalization data are obtained 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We use Thomson Financial' s CDA 
Spectrum Historical Tape Files (13F) for institutional investor data.  
The initial sample contains 14’873 observations for 3’956 different firms in the Execucomp 
database. Firms a re excluded from this initial sample if they are financial institutions (SIC codes 
6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4800-4999), quasi-regulated industries (SIC codes 8000 and 
above), or if the firms have missing data in I/B/E/S, CRSP, or Compustat. We also exclude firm-
year observations in which a company has incomplete or inconsistent details concerning the options 
granted to its CEO (e.g. missing maturity date, missing exercise price or a maturity date smaller than 
the grant date). We exclude as well firm-years in which a company belongs to an industry that 
contains less than 8 other companies for that year. Industries are grouped as in Yermack (1995). 
Finally, we do not use any observations from the year 1992, for which Execucomp reports 
                                                                   
5 Using the I/B/E/S monthly consensus mean instead of our own consensus yields quantitatively very similar 
results and does not affect any main result.   15
compensation data for only 433 CEOs.
6 After filtering the data as described above, only 174 
observations remain for or that year. Another reason for the year's exclusion is the fact that it was the 
first year in which executive compensation information was published in the present format and we 
do not want to introduce any self-selection biases in case the characteristics of the firms (not) 
reporting are correlated with the firm characteristics used in the construction of our explanatory 
variables. The final sample contains 8’714 firm-year observations.  
4.2  Measuring expectations management 
Measuring true analyst expectations is already a difficult task. Whether analysts have been 
manipulated by firm managements in order to issue relatively low forecasts (expectations 
management) cannot, obviously, be directly observed. Prior research has developed two proxies to 
capture expectations management. One method (cf. Richardson et al. 2003, Chan et al. 2003) 
makes use of tracking the analyst forecast error over the forecast period. Expectations management 
is suspected when analyst forecasts are optimistically biased (EPS forecast > EPS announced) at the 
beginning of the period and end up with a pessimistic bias prior to the announcement (EPS forecast 
< EPS announced). The alternative m ethod (cf. Matsumoto 2002, Brown and Higgins 2002) is to 
model the expected forecast as a function of public information about the firm’s performance 
(measured by EPS changes and stock price returns) and compare it with the last consensus forecast. 
Expectations management is suspected when the last consensus forecast is below the expected 
forecast. 
We apply the Matsumoto (2002) method since the former measure is inappropriate for our 
study for two main reasons. The main research question of our paper is whether expectations 
management is related to various CEO compensation components. Hence, the focus of our research 
is on the manipulation of analysts (as opposed to earnings). However, any measure that involves 
comparing forecasts with announced earnings cannot differentiate between analyst and earnings 
manipulation, since announced earnings are directly subject to earnings management. The Matsumoto 
                                                                   
6 In 1992 only S&P500 companies were included in the database.   16
measure, however, is based on the comparison of the consensus forecast and the expected forecast, 
which does not contain the current year’s announced earnings.
7  
The second problem with the former method for our purpose is that certain compensation 
components are related to the expectations management measure by construction. Suppose, for 
instance a positive earnings shock during the forecasting period. This implies both a larger bonus and 
higher EPS announced. If the earnings shock comes as a surprise at the announcement it will not be 
reflected in the forecast, thus producing a positive correlation between the proxy for expectations 
measurement and the bonus payment. In contrast, the Matsumoto measure comparing the last 
consensus with the expected forecast is not flawed with this problem. If the shock is public 
information then it should be reflected in both forecast and expected forecast (via prices). If it 
remains a surprise (deliberately or not) until the announcement it should neither affect forecast nor 
expected forecast. 
We adapt Matsumoto’s (2002) methodology to annual data. For each firm i in industry j during 
year t, the yearly change in earnings is modeled as a function of prior yearly change in earnings and 
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where: 
ijt EPS D  =  earnings per share for firm i in industry group j in year t, less earnings per share for 
the same firm one year prior, as reported by I/B/E/S. 
ijt P  =  price per share for firm i in industry group j at the end of year t. 
ijt CUMRET  =  cumulative daily excess return for firm i in industry group j during year t. Returns 
are cumulated from three days after year t-1 earnings announcement to 20 days 
before year t earnings announcement. 
                                                                   
7 Announced earnings only enter indirectly in the computation of the expected EPS change as the difference 
between the earnings of the prior year and the year before that. See below. 
8 Returns are intended to capture additional value-relevant information that an analyst might use to estimate 
earnings.   17
The model is estimated for each industry group using all firms in that year that belong to the 
group. Industry groups are defined as in Yermack (1995). In a year, there must be at least eight 
companies in a particular industry group for the equation to be estimated. The parameter estimates 
from the prior industry-year are used to determine the expected change in earnings per share 
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.  (2) 
This value is added to the previous year’s earnings to obtain an estimate of the expected analyst 
forecast ( [] EFEPS ) for the current year’s earnings: 
1 ijtijtijt EFEPSEPSEEPS - ØøØø =+D ºßºß .  (3) 
Similar to Matsumoto, we define a dichotomous variable DOWN comparing the last analyst 
consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement date (FEPS ) and the expected analyst 
forecast computed from the model: 
1 DOWN = if ijtijt FEPSEFEPS Øø < ºß  
indicating that analyst expectations can be suspected of having been managed downward, and 
0 DOWN = if   ijtijt FEPSEFEPS Øø ‡ ºß  
indicating that analyst expectations have not been managed downward. 
In Table 1, we report the average value of the coefficients obtained from the industry regressions 
described in equation  (1) as well as the average value of their associated t-statistics, together with 
regression R-squares. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
On average, changes in EPS are positively and significantly associated with cumulative excess 
returns. EPS changes are also positively associated with past changes in earnings. However, the 
average significance level is weaker.    18
Figure 1 depicts the dynamic pattern of the average forecast error over the annual forecast 
horizon for the full sample and two sub-samples: firm-year observations for which expectations 
management can be suspected ( 1 DOWN = ) and firm-year observations for which expectations 
management is not suspected ( 0 DOWN = ). For each firm and for each month leading up to the 
earnings announcement, the scaled forecast error is computed as the median of individual analysts’ 
EPS forecasts minus the announced EPS, deflated by the stock price at the previous fiscal year end: 
1 ()/ ititit FEPSEPSP - - . The graphs display the average values across firms over time. Forecast 
errors with earnings forecasts issued less than 30 days prior to the earnings announcement are 
grouped in month 0, forecast errors using forecasts released in the window (-60, -31) days are in 
month -1, etc.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
For both sub-samples, analysts are on average too optimistic at the beginning of the period and 
become increasingly pessimistic as the earnings announcement approaches. However, at the 
beginning of the forecast period, analysts appear to be far more optimistic for firms that are 
suspected of manipulating analysts than for those that are not. The difference in the average scaled 
forecast error remains statistically significant until eight months prior to the earning release date. At 
the end of the forecast period, there is a reversal in the sign of this difference: analysts are significantly 
more pessimistic ( t-stat. = 1.98) for firms suspected of managing expectations downward. 
Furthermore, 73.36% of the firm-year observations for which a positive or zero earnings surprise is 
reported belong to the sample for which expectations management can be suspected, whereas only 
69.11% of the firm-year observations belong to this sample when a negative earnings surprise is 
reported. A Chi-square test indicates that the dependence between DOWN and firms that report a 
positive earnings surprise is significant ( 2 16.23 c = , p-value<0.001). Overall, this suggests that our 
measure for expectations management is capable of distinguishing between firms that manipulate 
analysts in order to report a positive (zero) earnings surprises and those that do not.  
4.3  Measuring CEO compensation components and ownership variables 
We obtain the dollar value of each CEO’s annual base salary, the dollar value of the CEO’s 
annual bonus, the amount paid out to the CEO according to the company’s long-term incentive plans   19
(LTIP), and the value of restricted stock grants (RSG) awarded during the year directly from the 
Execucomp database. In addition, we compute the value of the firm’s shares held by the CEO at the 
end of the fiscal year (SHARE) to assess the impact of the total share position (as opposed to the 
stock grants awarded in the present year only) on expectations management.
9 We use the value of 
in-the-money and exercisable options (INMONEX ) held by the CEO to measure the impact of the 
entire relevant option position. This item is provided directly by Execucomp and includes all these 
options from current and prior year grants.  
Considering the non-linear relationship between share and option price and hence differing 
option sensitivities to stock price changes, we construct a variable measuring the value change of the 
CEO’s newly awarded options due to a one percent increase in the company’s stock price 
(OPTSENS). Following Core and Guay (2001), we estimate the sensitivity of stock option value to 
stock price as the partial derivative of the option value with respect to stock price (“delta”). The 
option deltas are based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula, as modified by Merton (1973) to 
account for dividend payments.
10 The detailed methodology and the parameters used to compute the 
value of the options awarded annually to CEOs are presented in the appendix. In addition, to 
measure the impact of the options granted over prior years, we use the value of in-the-money and 
exercisable o ptions ( INMONEX ) held by the CEO. Since Execucomp reports detailed 
characteristics (e.g. maturity, strike price) only for the options that have been granted during the 
current fiscal year, we cannot compute a sensitivity measure for the INMONEX options to stock 
price changes as we do for the current year’s options. However, the delta of in-the-money options 
from previous years approaches the value one relatively quickly once the stock price exceeds the 
                                                                   
9 Execucomp reports the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by the CEO as reported in the proxy statement. 
We multiply this percentage with the market value (taken from CRSP) at the fiscal year end to obtain the value of 
the firm’s share position owned by the CEO. Ownership below 1% does not have to be reported. Following 
common practice we set missing values equal to zero. Execucomp also contains the number of the company’s 
shares owned by the CEO. This item allows computing positions below the 1% threshold since it contains 
voluntary disclosures. Likely due to different times of measurement some values above the threshold are 
inconsistent across the two methods. However, our results in this paper do not depend on which data item is 
used to compute the value of the CEO’s shares. 
10 We are aware that the Black-Scholes approach has many limitations for executive stock options: executives are 
limited by institutional restrictions to hedge or arbitrage their option values in the secondary market, their options 
are subject to forfeiture if they leave the company, and they are not free to trade or sell their options. In addition, 
company executives are undiversified, with their financial as well as human capital invested disproportionately in 
their company. As a result, CEOs tend to exercise their options much earlier than outside investors would. 
However, as underlined by Core and Guay (2001), the Black-Scholes model can be considered as an accurate 
method to produce an instrumental variable to capture cross-sectional variation in option plan deltas.   20
strike. Therefore, implicitly assuming a delta equal to one, the INMONEX value could loosely be 
interpreted as a sensitivity measure, too. This item is provided by Execucomp and includes all in-the-
money exercisable options from the current and prior year grants.  
[Insert table 2 here] 
Tabl e 2 summarizes the CEO compensation components. The average amount of restricted 
stocks (RSG) granted to CEOs is relatively small compared to other compensation components. Its 
mean is $308’450 and less than 33% of CEOs receive restricted stocks. The mean (median) value 
of shares held by CEOs equals $2.61 ($0.24) million, with a range from 0 to $1.32 billion. The 
average (median) amount of in-the-money exercisable options held by CEOs (INMONEX) is $8.88 
(1.01) million, with a range from 0 to almost $2 billion. An increase in the share price of 1% leads to 
an average value increase of the stock options awarded annually to CEOs (OPTSENS) of $44’463. 
This amount varies substantially across sample observations, with a standard deviation of $188’150. 
The mean annual bonus paid to CEOs equals approximately $0.53 million, ranging from 0 to more 
than $43 million. The average value of long-term incentive plans paid to CEOs is $135’184. Again, 
this amount varies substantially across CEOs since less than 33% do receive long-term incentive plan 
payments. Finally, the average annual base salary paid to CEOs equals $575’141. As it is the case 
for the other compensation components, the distribution for base salary is highly skewed, some 
CEOs receiving no annual base salary at all. 
Therefore, and for reasons following below, we measure all compensation and ownership 
variables as well as some highly skewed control variables with the values assigned by their 
cumulative distribution functions (hereafter referred to as cdf) in the regression analysis. The cdf 
transformation generates a more uniform distribution of the transformed variables, which enhances 
the speed of convergence of the parameter estimates to the true population parameters. In addition, 
the effect of outliers is mitigated without discarding this information completely as done in censoring 
the sample. Furthermore, this transformation is consistent with imposing decreasing marginal effects 
as the variables increase. Intuitively, this postulates that the first $1000 of any compensation 
component have greater importance than a $1000 variation at high income or ownership levels. The 
cdf transformation is similar to the log transformation commonly applied to firm size. However, the 
log transformation is less appropriate for the compensation and ownership variables, since there is a   21
large number of observations with value zero. Moreover, the use of the cdf transformation is not 
problematic for this study, since we are mainly interested whether distinct components of executive 
compensation increase or decrease the probability of expectations management (i.e. we are after the 
sign of the estimated coefficients), rather than estimating precisely the marginal effect of a $1000 
increase in executive remuneration on the probability to manage analysts. 
4.4  Control variables 
We include additional explanatory variables to control for earnings thresholds, information 
environment, growth prospects, and further firm-specifics that are potentially related to expectations 
management. Degeorge et al. (1999) suggest that executives acting in self interest and being subject 
to outside monitoring have strong incentives to manipulate earnings around behavioral thresholds. In 
their analysis of EPS and forecast error distributions, Degeorge et al. find evidence consistent with 
earnings management in order to exceed zero earnings, past earnings, and analyst expectations. We 
include three control variables to capture these thresholds. The indicator variable  LOSS  equals one 
if a particular firm reports a loss in the current fiscal year (annual Compustat item A18). MEET  is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s reported EPS at the announcement date meets or beats 
analyst expectations, as measured by the last consensus estimate prior to the announcement date. 
The indicator variable INCEPS  equals one if the firm reports a positive earnings variation relative to 
the previous year (Compustat item A18).  
A priori, the direction of these threshold variables’ influence on the probability of expectations 
management is not unambiguous. Degeorge et al. (1999) illustrate that depending on how close latent 
earnings are below or above a performance threshold executives will have various differing incentives 
to exaggerate reported earnings, rein in, take big baths, or not manipulate at all. Since it is difficult to 
predict whether analyst guidance will serve as a substitute or complement of earnings management 
for different levels of latent earnings and for the differing thresholds, we make no prediction regarding 
the sign of the thresholds included as control variables. As an alternative set of tests we condition the 
sample on reaching the thresholds. 
Brown and Higgins (2002) find that guidance increases with the richness of the firm’s information 
environment. They characterize information environment as the availability and effectiveness of   22
communication between managers and analysts and document a positive relationship between a 
firm’s analyst coverage and the probability of expectations management. Using the absolute value of 
the final forecast error as an alternative proxy for information environment, they find a negative 
relationship between forecast error magnitude and expectations management.  
We measure a f irm’s informational environment by using two related proxies. First, we include 
residual analyst coverage (RCOV) as proposed by Hong et al. (2000). Residual analyst coverage is 
the residual from the regression of the logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm 
on the logarithm of the market value of the company taken at the beginning of the fiscal year. The 
number of analysts for a particular firm-year corresponds to the number of estimates which constitute 
the last consensus forecast released before the earnings announcement date. Using residual coverage 
instead of the number of analysts following the firm provides a measure that does not proxy for a 
firm’s market capitalization. As shown by Hong et al. (2000), market value is the most important 
determinant of analyst coverage. Consistent with Brown and Higgins (2002), we expect a positive 
relationship between expectations management and residual analyst coverage. Our second proxy for 
informational environment is the absolute value of the initial forecast error ( IFE) as in Matsumoto 
(2002). We compute it as  ||/
ini
ititit FEPSEPSP - , where 
ini
it FEPS is the first consensus forecast 
released by analysts for company i in year t,  it EPS  is the company’s actual earnings per share, and 
it P  is the company’s share price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Matsumoto documents a strong 
negative relationship between the initial forecast error and the probability that a firm meets or beats 
analyst expectations.
11  
We include the firm’s long-term earnings growth forecast (LTG) as a proxy for its growth 
prospects, using the first consensus LTG released by I/B/E/S during the fiscal year. Prior research 
has found growth firms (high  LTG) to suffer large and asymmetric reactions to negative earnings 
surprises (Skinner and Sloan 2002). Brown (2001b) shows that growth firms have a higher 
probability of managing analysts compared to value firms. He accounts for this by the increase in 
managerial compensation in stocks and options. Due to the asymmetric market reaction to bad news, 
                                                                   
11 Note that Matsumoto (2002) also uses the logarithm of the firm market value as control variable for the firm 
information environment. Due to potential multi-collinearity problems between market capitalization and most of 
the compensation variables, we do not include this proxy for the informational environment. However, including 
the logarithm of the market value does not change any main conclusions.   23
growth firm managers’ portfolios will suffer a higher loss following a negative earnings surprise than 
those of value firm managers. Thus, if this explanation is valid, by i ncluding stock-based 
compensation and a proxy for growth jointly as explanatory variables for expectations management, 
there should not be any difference between the propensity of growth and value firms to engage in 
expectations management strategies. However, if the motives for growth firm managements to avoid 
negative surprises are not exclusively due to the structure of their management compensation, the 
growth proxy should remain positive and significant in explaining earnings management. For instance, 
Liu and Yao (2003) argue that firms use earnings guidance and consensus beating as a mechanism to 
credibly signal their growth potential. Matsumoto reports that firms with high growth prospects 
(measured by the analyst consensus long-term EPS growth forecast for the firm) are more likely to 
take actions to avoid negative surprises.
12 Alternatively, firms in distress (with very low market-to-
book) might depend particularly on short-term earnings surprises in order to obtain additional 
financing or signal recovery to stakeholders, which would suggest a negative relationship between 
analyst guidance and growth prospects. 
We include three additional variables to control for the value-relevance of earnings, reliance on 
implicit claims with stakeholders, and litigation risk. Matsumoto (2002) shows that firms with low 
value-relevance of earnings are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises, since market reactions 
are expected to be relatively moderate. We use EARNRET to control for the value-relevance of 
earnings. It is computed as the decile rank of the  2 R  from yearly industry-specific regressions of 
cumulative excess returns on yearly changes in earnings.
13 Matsumoto finds that firms depending 
particularly on implicit claims with stakeholders are more likely to take actions to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. She argues that avoiding negative surprises at the earnings announcement yields 
more favorable terms of trade with stakeholders, such as suppliers, clients, and employees. These 
groups are likely to limit their assessment of a company’s financial performance to reported earnings, 
since the financial press focuses its attention primarily on earnings announcements rather than initial 
                                                                   
12 Instead of using LTG we also perform our estimations with the market-to-book ratio. Our results are insensitive 
to this modification.  
13 Firms are grouped into industry sets as in Yermack (1995). Every year, for each industry group, we regress 
cumulated daily excess returns (cumulated from three days after the fiscal year t-1 earnings announcement date to 
20 days before fiscal year t earnings announcement) on the change in earnings per share from fiscal year t-1 to 
fiscal year t, scaled by the share price at the end of fiscal year t-1. We require each industry group to contain at 
least 8 firms. The firms with 
2 R s in the highest (lowest) 10% of the distribution are assigned a value of 10 (1).    24
analyst forecasts. We use the proxies LABOR, DUR, and R&D, developed by Bowen et al. (1995) 
to measure reliance on implicit claims. LABOR is a measure of labor intensity, defined as one minus 
the ratio of total gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item A7) to firm size, measured 
by total gross assets (total assets plus accumulated depreciation, depletion, and amortization with 
Compustat items A6 and A196 respectively). The indicator variable DUR denotes membership in 
the durable goods industry sectors and equals one for firms with primary (three-digit) SIC codes 
150-179, 245, 250-259, 283, 301, and 324-399. R&D denotes research intensity, computed as 
annual research and development expenditures (Compustat item A46) divided by total assets 
(Compustat item A6). Employing factor analysis with principal component factors we transform 
LABOR,  DUR, and  R&D into the single variable  ICLAIM, representing reliance on implicit 
claims.
14 
Furthermore, a strong price drop at the earnings announcement can give rise to shareholder 
litigation. Therefore, firms with a higher risk of shareholders filing lawsuits may take more actions to 
avoid negative earnings surprises. Consistent with Francis et al. (1994), Soffer et al. (2000), Ali and 
Kallapur (2001), and Matsumoto (2002), we control for litigation risk by including the dummy 
variable LIT indicating whether a firm belongs to an industry classified as litigious. LIT equals one for 
firms with primary SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374 
(biotechnology, electronics, retailing, and computers). 
Finally we control for institutional ownership. Matsumoto (2002) finds that firms with a higher 
percentage of institutional owners are more likely to guide analysts in order to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. In particular transient institutional investors with relatively high portfolio turnover, 
diversified positions, and high use of momentum strategies are likely to create incentives for 
executives to avoid negative surprises due to their strong short-term focus. TRAN measures the 
percentage of a firm’s shares held by transient institutional investors. In order to classify institutional 
                                                                   
14 Almost one third of the observations for R&D are missing. Following Bowen et al. (1995) and Matsumoto (2002) 
we replace missing values by the value zero. The results do not depend on this ad-hoc assumption. We also 
perform all regressions with LABOR, DUR , and R&D jointly and individually included as additional explanatory 
variables. The coefficients of DUR and R&D are never significantly different from zero. Only LABOR is (highly) 
significant and positive, thus behaving identically as ICLAIM.    25
investors into different types, we apply the cluster analysis approach developed by Bushee (1998), 
using Thomson Financial' s CDA Spectrum Historical Tape Files (13F).
15 
[Insert table 3 here] 
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of the control variables. Only 8.0% of the firm-year 
observations are firms with reported losses. The thresholds of meeting or beating analyst forecasts 
and reporting increased EPS have been reached in 71% and 67% of firm-years respectively. 
Residual analyst coverage ranges from -1.73 to 1.33 with the median of 0.021 close to zero. IFE 
contains very large outliers. With 17.5% the average long-term growth consensus forecast is 
relatively high. More than 66% of the firm-year observations have long-term growth forecasts that 
are higher than 12.9%. Firms in the durable goods industries account for 41.7% of the firm-year 
observations, firms in litigious industries account for 35.5%. Due to the replacement of missing values 
with zeros,  R&D is highly skewed as well, with about 30% of the values being zero. We use it 
together with LABOR and DUR to generate ICLAIM, which has zero mean and variance one by 
construction. Finally, the percentage of firm  shares held by transient institutional investors (TRAN) is 
4.9% on average and ranges from 0.0% to 53.8%.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Table 4, we report Pearson correlation coefficients between  DOWN and the exogenous 
variables, where SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, LTG 
and  TRANS are expressed as the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. As 
hypothesized,  DOWN is positively and significantly correlated with  INMONEX,  OPTSENS, 
BONUS, and LTIP. SALARY is also positively correlated with DOWN unconditionally, which is in 
opposition to the prediction. Consistent with prior research, there is a significant negative correlation 
between  DOWN and  IFE as well as a significant positive correlation between  DOWN and 
ICLAIM. Contrary to expectation,  RCOV and  EARNRET are significantly negatively correlated 
                                                                   
15 Bushee (1998) constructs a set of nine variables that characterize the past investments of institutional 
investors. These variables are related to the degree of portfolio diversification, turnover, and the institution’s 
trading sensitivity to current earnings. Principal factor analysis with an oblique rotation is used to reduce the nine 
variables to three common factors. The factor scores are employed in the subsequent cluster analysis (k-means) 
to separate the institutions into three groups: transient (high turnover, high diversification, and high use of 
momentum strategies), dedicated (low turnover, high concentration, and little trading sensitivity to current 
earnings), and quasi-indexers (low turnover, high diversification, and contrarian-trading tendencies). A detailed 
description of the procedure is given in Bushee (1998).   26
with  DOWN. Among the explanatory variables, the compensation components and ownership 
variables are generally significantly positively correlated,
16 except for the value of company shares 
owned by CEOs, which is negatively correlated with the compensation components and option 
ownership. The annual bonus awarded to CEOs is positively related to MEET and INCEPS and 
negatively related to LOSS. The methodology for the multivariate tests is set up in the following 
section. 
4.5  Measuring the impact of CEO compensation on expectations management 
To test whether executive compensation components are associated with expectations 
management as postulated in our hypotheses, we perform a logit regression, modeling the probability 
that analyst expectations have been managed downward. 
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16 We conduct multicollinearity diagnostic tests computing the variance inflation factors (Kennedy 2000) for all 
variables used in the regression analysis. None of these factors displays a value greater than 10, thus indicating 
that multicollinearity does not cause any concern.   27
Consistent with prior research on expectations management and forecast guidance (Matsumoto 
2002, Richardson et al. 2003), we pool the observations from 1993 to 2001 performing the logit 
regression for the entire sample.
17 In all regressions indicator variables  94 Y  to  01 Y  control for year 
effects (relative to the base year 1993), which are not captured by the compensation and control 
variables. The indicator variables  1 I  to  1 - N I  represent industry effects. Industries are grouped as in 
Yermack (1995). 
One potential drawback of the pooled logit specification is unobserved heterogeneity. For 
instance, the CEO’s ability to guide or manipulate analysts is difficult to measure, but might be 
correlated with other explanatory variables, thus causing biased coefficient estimates. The executive’s 
skill to negotiate his or her compensation components with the compensation committee, for 
example, is likely to be correlated with the skill to deal with analysts, and will be reflected in the 
compensation variables. Moreover, differing attitudes toward business ethics or moral standards are 
just as hard to observe, but undeniably play a role in the CEO’s propensity to manage analysts. 
Therefore we estimate a fixed effects logit model, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm 
level. 
Since the estimation of the conditional logit model restricts the sample to firms with temporal 
variation in the endogenous variable, all the firms that are found to manage expectations throughout 
the entire sample period must be excluded from the regression as well as the firms for which the 
DOWN variable is 0 throughout. Moreover, the conditional logit estimator requires at least two years 
of observations for each firm. Since the exclusion of these "extreme" observations may diminish the 
significance of explanatory variables due to sample restriction, as opposed to correcting for 
unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate the random effects probit model, which is an alternative panel 
specification that takes unobserved heterogeneity into account without losing the firms deleted with 
the fixed effects logit method.  
In addition, we perform further sensitivity analyses relating t o variable measurement and 
conditioning the sample on behavioral thresholds. 
                                                                   
17 This implies the assumption that observations i = 1,...,N are independent, including consecutive observations 
of the same firm. In order to correct for firm clustering we compute robust standard errors adjusted for clustering. 
However, the corresponding p-values differ by less than 0.01 for the significant variables, so we do not report 
these standard errors (available upon request).   28
5  Results 
5.1  CEO compensation and expectations management 
Table 5 displays the results of the pooled logit regression of the analyst guidance measure DOWN 
on the compensation and ownership variables, controlling for year and industry effects and further 
firm-specific variables.
18  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, the value of shares owned by the CEO is positively and 
significantly related to the probability of  expectations management. However, the variable  RSG 
(restricted stock grants) is not significantly different from zero and has a negative sign. We attribute 
this result to the failure of the variable (in the raw form) to measure the value of stock at the disposal 
of the executive for short term transactions. RSG measures the value of the restricted stocks 
awarded in the current year only, during which the vesting period has typically not yet ended. 
SHARE is likely a much better proxy to measure the CEO’s incentive from stock ownership than 
RSG, since it measures the value of the CEO’s total position of firm shares. 
Supporting our second hypothesis, there is a positive and highly significant relationship between 
the value of in-the-money exercisable options and expectations management. Further support of our 
hypothesis is given by the positive and again highly significant coefficient of OPTSENS,  indicating 
that analyst guidance is positively associated with the stock price sensitivity of option grants. 
Consistent with our third hypothesis, the relationship between bonus and analyst guidance is 
positive and highly significant. Although the large positive coefficient on long-term incentive plans 
LTIP is consistent with our fourth hypothesis, it is not statistically significant.
19 
Consistent with our fifth hypothesis, salary has a highly significant negative influence on the 
probability of expectations management.  
                                                                   
18 Coefficients on the year and industry dummies are not reported. Each group of dummy variables is jointly 
highly significant. 
19 Recall that long-term incentive plan payments are zero for 86% of the firm year observations, which leads to a 
large standard error. Dropping this variable does not affect the results for the other variables.   29
The three threshold variables LOSS,  INCEPS, and  MEET are all strongly significant, with 
INCEPS having  a negative coefficient. Consistent with prior research (Matsumoto 2002), the 
variable proxying for forecasting uncertainty IFE, is negative and highly significant. In contrast to 
Matsumoto, we do not find EARNRET significant. Nor is it the case for long-term growth forecast 
LTG, residual analyst coverage RCOV, implicit claims ICLAIM, and litigation risk LIT. 
In particular, the rejection of a positive coefficient on LTG is in sharp contrast to prior research 
neglecting CEO compensation variables. Likely, as conjectured by Brown (2001b), market-to-book 
was found positive and significant in explaining analyst management due to growth firms’ pronounced 
stock and option remuneration practices.
20 In our sample, we control for these effects and find no 
more positive effect of LTG on expectations management. This is consistent with Brown’s (2001b) 
view and contradicts the argument of Liu and Tao (2003) that growth firms use analyst guidance as a 
device for signaling future earnings growth. 
As in Matsumoto (2002),  LIT  is negative and insignificant, whereas  TRAN is positive as 
predicted and highly significant, which supports the hypothesis that transient institutional investors 
create pressure on managements to boost short-term performance with earnings surprises. 
In summary, the pooled regression with firm-specific control variables, year and industry effects 
strongly supports our hypotheses about the relationship between expectations management and the 
CEO compensation components salary and bonus, stock and option positions, as well as option 
sensitivity. 
5.2  Sensitivity tests 
The results of modeling the dependence across units in a panel framework are presented in 
Table 6. The fixed effects logit regression of DOWN on the compensation, ownership, and control 
variables is displayed in Panel A.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
                                                                   
20 In order to replicate these results of previous research, we regress DOWN on the market-to-book ratio alone 
and the year effects: as expected the coefficient of MTB is significantly positive when executive compensation is 
not controlled for.    30
All compensation and ownership components maintain their sign, but compared to the pooled 
logit estimation, the marginal effect of the in-the-money exercisable options INMONEX is now twice 
as large.  INMONEX and  OPTSENS are still highly significant.  SALARY and BONUS remain 
significant at the conventional level. No longer significant however, is the CEO’s position of the firm’s 
stocks SHARE.  
In the set of control variables, the thresholds  LOSS,  INCEPS, and  MEET remain highly 
significant. As in the pooled logit estimation, the initial forecast error has the predicted negative 
influence on expectations management and the percentage of shares held by transient institutional 
investors has the predicted positive influence at high levels of significance. The signs of EARNRET, 
LTG and LIT are in opposition to the prediction as before. However, compared to the pooled logit 
estimation, residual analyst coverage and implicit claims become significant and weakly significant 
respectively, both with the predicted positive signs. 
The strong changes in the magnitudes of LTIP and INMONEX could be a sign of unobserved 
heterogeneity at the firm or equivalently CEO level, possibly relating to skill or ethical standards. 
However, the conditional logit approach is flawed with the deletion of all firms with the endogenous 
variable indicating expectations management in all years as well as the firms without expectations 
management in each year. This way 1’166 "extreme" observations (13.4% of  the sample) are 
ignored. Therefore, the results must be interpreted with some caution. Nevertheless, the fixed effects 
logit estimation corroborates the pooled logit results that analyst guidance is negatively related to the 
CEO compensation component salary and positively related to the CEO’s bonus, as well as to the 
CEO’s in-the-money exercisable option position and the option sensitivity. 
Compared to the fixed effect logit regression, the random effect probit approach has the 
advantage that it does not discard any firms without time series variation in DOWN, but it imposes 
the restriction that the unit specific effects be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The results 
are displayed in Table 6, Panel B. All the variables that were significant in the pooled logit regression 
remain significant with the same signs as in the random effects probit regression. Again with the 
exception of  RSG and LTIP, the coefficients of all compensation and ownership variables support 
our hypotheses relating expectations management to executive compensation. SALARY, BONUS, 
SHARE, INMONEX, and OPTSENS are highly significant (with p-values <0.01).   31
We take the pooled logit specification to another sensitivity analysis conditioning on the 
behavioral thresholds rather than including each threshold directly in the regressions. This appears 
appropriate if the incentives to manage analysts, produced by executive compensation components, 
depend on reaching the earnings thresholds: positive profits (LOSS = 0), positive change in earnings 
(INCEPS = 1), and reported earnings  = consensus forecast ( MEET = 1). The results of 
conditioning the logit regression on these thresholds are displayed in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The evidence is consistent with the view that reaching earnings thresholds is important for the 
influence of  certain incentive variables on expectations management, although not for all variables. 
INMONEX is always positive and significant, independent of reaching any of the thresholds. The 
same holds true for OPTSENS except for restricting the sample to firms with decreasing EPS. 
SALARY, BONUS, and  SHARE are highly significant with the predicted signs in all regressions, 
conditional on reaching the respective thresholds (Panel A). When the thresholds have not been 
reached (Panel B), these variables are typically not significant anymore, except BONUS conditional 
on decreasing EPS. The control variables  IFE and  TRAN  are always highly significant with the 
predicted signs when the respective thresholds have been reached. When thresholds have not been 
reached, these variables are only significant in the case that the forecast was missed. In each 
subsample, the remaining two threshold variables stay significant, except LOSS when conditioning on 
missing the forecast. The coefficient of LTG is negative throughout. 
Again we interpret these results as strong support for our hypotheses, with the compensation in 
stock options providing a particularly strong incentive to manage analysts in all the scenarios under 
test. The result that  SALARY,  BONUS, and  SHARE while being highly significant in the 
unconditional regressions, are not significant when earnings thresholds have not been reached, can be 
reconciled with the fact that thresholds have been reached far more often than missed in our sample. 
To summarize, we find that pooling observations, estimating panel models, and conditioning the 
sample on behavioral thresholds altogether lend strong support to our hypotheses. Our major 
conclusions are not sensitive to the method applied. 
5.3  CEO compensation and small earnings surprises   32
With the results in the previous subsections we have demonstrated the strong role of CEO 
remuneration in explaining analyst guidance. A related question is whether the same compensation 
and ownership variables also predict the occurrence of small earnings surprises, measured by BEAT, 
which equals one if the announced EPS exceed the consensus forecast by no more than five cents. 
Reporting small surprises is a feature of growth stocks that has been observed in prior research 
(Brown 2001b). Besides chance, an increased propensity to report small earnings surprises could be 
the result of either analyst guidance (low consensus) or earnings management (discretionary 
accruals). We expect the same signs for the coefficients of the compensation and ownership 
variables as in explaining downward guidance.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 shows that most of all, SHARE and INMONEX positively predict the occurrence of 
small earnings surprises.  SHARE is highly significant while  INMONEX is significant at the 
conventional level ( p-value 0.016).  SALARY has the expected negative coefficient,  BONUS 
displays the predicted positive effect. However, these variables are only weakly significant. 
Moreover, the earnings threshold variables LOSS a nd  INCEPS are highly significant as well as 
RCOV, IFE, and LTG,  all with the expected signs. As expected, TRAN has a significant positive 
effect on the occurrence of small earnings surprises.  
We infer that in-the-money exercisable options, and the CEO’s p osition of the firm’s shares 
have an equally important role in explaining small earnings surprises as they have in downward 
guidance of analyst forecasts. 
5.4  Does the market figure it out? 
In contrast to earnings management, expectations management does not induce managers to 
borrow against future earnings in order to reach the target set by analysts. However, investors seem 
to punish firms that do not reach analysts’ expectations (Skinner and Sloan 2003). Yet, to date it is 
unknown whether and to what extent the market reacts to predictable expectations management by 
executives.    33
We conduct an event study to investigate whether the market takes into account any discernible 
expectations management strategies. This requires the calculation of the cumulative abnormal returns 
around the earnings announcement date. We estimate the following equation: 
itiimtiitit RRD able =+++   (5) 
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i A =  earnings announcement date for firm i 
it R  =  log return of stock i on day t adjusted for capital changes and dividends 
mt R  =  log return of the market index on day t 
i l  =  Cumulative abnormal return for stock i between  2 i A -  and  2 i A + .
21 
The earnings announcement date is taken from I/B/E/S, individual stock returns are obtained 
from CRSP, and the market index is the CRSP value-weighted stock index. Equation  (5) is 
estimated with a weighted least square regression as in Heinkel and Kraus (1988)
22 to correct for 
missing returns. Announcement date returns are missing for 51 observations. As a result, we estimate 
the model for 8’663 firm-year observations.  
Table 9 summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns earned by firms at the announcement dates. 
Consistent with previous research, firms that meet or beat analyst expectations (zero or positive 
earnings surprise) earn a significant positive abnormal return of 1.30% during the period surrounding 
the announcement date. On the other hand, firms that fail to meet analyst expectations display a 
cumulative abnormal return of –1.50% during that period. The return differential between firms that 
meet or beat expectations and those that fail to do so equals a highly significant 2.80%. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
                                                                   
21 As a first step we conduct an analysis of abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date. We 
observe most significant abnormal returns during the five days chosen as the event window.    34
In Table 10, we present cumulative abnormal returns conditional on whether a particular 
company meets or beats analyst expectations and conditional on whether expectations management 
can be suspected according to our method.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
The  cumulative abnormal returns earned by firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts by 
managing analyst expectations downward are 0.93% lower than the cumulative abnormal returns of 
firms reporting a zero or positive surprise without managing expectations downward. On average, 
managers who engage in analyst manipulation still earn a positive abnormal return, but this abnormal 
return amounts to only 1.03% over the period surrounding the announcement date. This suggests that 
the market has some ability to anticipate the expectations management strategies implemented by 
managers. For firms that do not meet analyst expectations, no significant difference is observed in 
cumulative abnormal returns conditional on whether expectations management is suspected. 
The objective of the following analysis is to investigate whether the lower abnormal returns 
reported for firms suspected of managing analyst expectations downward depend on CEO 
compensation components and on firm-specific variables which have been shown to impact analyst 
guidance. Thus, we aim to assess which variables are taken into account by investors to detect 
potential analyst manipulation strategies. We model cumulative abnormal returns of firms that meet or 
beat analyst expectations as a function of a subset of the explanatory variables used in the preceding 
analysis. This subset contains only those explanatory variables that were significant in our first set of 
tests and those that are either partially or fully known by the market at the earnings announcement 
date.  













,  (6) 
where INST is the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors at the end of the 
fiscal year. We substitute the percentage of shares held by transient institutional investors by the 
percentage of shares held by all categories of institutional investors at the end of the fiscal year, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
22 The weights are the square roots of the number of days over which the return is computed.   35
because the variable TRAN contains future information, to an extent.
23 It was constructed with 
principal factor analysis over the entire sample characterizing institutional investors according to their 
investment strategies.
24 Hence, including  TRAN in the regression could create a look-ahead bias. 
Beside the significant impact of institutional ownership on expectations management, its inclusion is 
further motivated by recent research that documents a relationship between institutional ownership 
and market reaction at earnings announcements (Hotchkiss and Strickland 2003). The other 
variables are defined as before.25  
Table 11 summarizes the estimation results for equation (6). Only the coefficient of  INMONEX  
is significant at the conventional level. For firms that meet or beat market expectations,  INMONEX  
is significantly negatively related to the market reaction following the earnings announcement. Hence, 
market participants seem to react less strongly to positive earnings surprises when the CEO holds a 
large amount of options that can be exercised after the earnings release date. Investors appear to be 
able to infer from CEOs' option positions which managers are more likely to play the guidance game. 
Naturally, we cannot rule out that INMONEX is related to omitted firm characteristics that explain 
how stock prices will respond to earnings news. Regarding the low adjusted  2 R , there might indeed 
be other variables that can explain the documented lower abnormal return at the announcement for 
firms that manage analyst expectations downward. We leave this issue for further research. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
In summary, we show that the gains for CEOs from managing earnings expectations downward 
also comes at a cost for executives. The abnormal return for firms that manage to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts by manipulating expectations downward is significantly lower than the abnormal 
return for firms that fulfill market estimates without manipulating analyst expectations. Our results 
                                                                   
23 Replacing TRAN with INST in the preceding analysi s does not affect any results. Like TRAN, INST is positive 
and highly significant throughout. 
24 Although institutional investors are classified annually according to their investment strategies of the previous 
year, the factor analysis reducing the nine investment variables into three common factors is performed over the 
pooled sample. 
25 Note that it is probably difficult for investors to assess the exact value of  INMONEX at the announcement 
date. However, due to the vesting period attached to the awarded stock options,  INMONEX  contains options 
that have generally been granted to CEOs during past fiscal years. Investors are therefore able to estimate the 
approximate value of  INMONEX  from companies’ previous proxy statements. Concerning SHARE, investors can 
also infer the shares owned by CEOs from the proxy statement. Moreover, companies have to report all insider 
trades on a regular basis.   36
indicate that the reduced abnormal return for companies suspected of managing analysts is positively 
related to the value of in-the-money exercisable options owned by CEOs. 
6  Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the increasing tendency of executives to manage analyst 
forecasts downward is, as informally suggested by past academic research and financial media, 
related to a change in the structure of executive compensation packages. Using CEO compensation 
components in conjunction with their share and option ownership, our results are consistent with this 
explanation. We show that CEOs who hold considerable share and option positions are more likely 
to manage analyst expectations downward. Moreover, other compensation components that are not 
directly related to share price movements are shown to have a significant impact on CEOs’ analyst 
guidance motives. Expectations management is negatively related to salary, indicating that high fixed 
compensation decreases the incentives of managers to manipulate analyst forecasts. Furthermore, we 
document a positive relationship between the annual bonus paid to CEOs and expectations 
management. This suggests that board of directors’ expectations are related to analyst expectations 
and that meeting analyst expectations may be an important criterion used by boards of directors to 
measure CEO performance.  
In a second set of tests, we find that the cumulative abnormal return for firms that meet or beat 
analyst forecasts at the announcement date is significantly lower for firms that are likely to pursue 
expectations management strategies. We show that this lower return is significantly related to the 
amount of options held by CEOs. This suggests that the market has some ability to identify firms that 
manage analysts in order to meet or beat their forecasts more easily.  
Using a large U.S. sample, we document for the first time the importance and impact of CEO 
compensation components on expectations management. However, our results may not generalize to 
all market segments, since the substantial amount of data needed to conduct this study requires a 
sample with relatively large firms. Moreover, since executive compensation components are only 
available from the main provider on an annual basis, we conduct our study with annual EPS 
forecasts. As a result, our results may not be generalized to quarterly earnings forecasts.    37
Promising directions for further research include extending the set of executives beyond the CEO 
to study compensation and ownership effects on expectations management as well as devising 
trading strategies based on executive compensation information and earnings "surprises". Finally, 
temporal trends could be modeled more explicitly in order to examine whether the documented 
temporal patterns in analyst guidance and earnings surprises can be entirely explained by the strong 
growth in stock price sensitive components of executive compensation.   38
Appendix 
Measuring the sensitivity of the CEO’s stock option award to a 1% price change of the 
underlying company’s stock price 
The value of the options awarded yearly to CEOs can be calculated with the following formula: 
(1)(1) s
-- Øø =F-F- ºß
dTrT AwardvalueNSedXedT   (7) 
where 










  (8) 
N  =  number of shares covered by the award,
26 
S =  price of the underlying stock, 
X  =  exercise price, 
r  =  risk-free interest rate, 
d  =  expected dividend rate over the life of the option, 
s  =  expected stock return volatility over the life of the option, 
T  =  time to maturity, 
F =  cumulative probability for the normal distribution. 
The sensitivity of the CEO’s stock option award to a 1% price change of the underlying 
company’s stock price in a given year (OPTSENS) is estimated in the following way: 
) 100 / (S N OPTSENS ￿ D ￿ = ,  (9) 
where  (1)
- D=F
dT ed . 
                                                                   
26 We consider all awarded options in our measure, including those that are awarded to adjust existing options 
(“reload” options). The results are not sensitive to this inclusion.   39
We use the following assumptions to estimate the parameters of the Black-Scholes formula: 
S =  market price of the company’s stock on the date of the option grant. 
r  =  ln(1+riskless interest rate), where the risk-free interest rate is the approximate 
average yield that could have been earned in the year in which the option was 
granted by investing in a U.S. Treasury bond carrying a seven year term. This 
yield is obtained from Execucomp. 
d  =  ln(1+dividend rate), with dividend rate defined as the company’s average 
dividend rate over the past three years. If, in a particular year, the dividend 
rate is above the 95
th percentile of the distribution of yields for that year, it is 
reduced to the 95
th percentile value. Dividend rate and 95
th percentile values 
are obtained from Execucomp. 
s  =  annualized volatility, estimated from past 60 months’ returns. If, in a particular 
year, a company’s stock volatility is in the bottom or top 5% of the cross-
sectional volatility distribution, its volatility is increased or decreased to the 5
th 
or 95
th percentile v alues. Annualized volatility and percentile values are taken 
from Execucomp. 
   40
References 
Aboody, D. and R. Kasznik, 2000, CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary 
disclosures, Journal of Accounting and Economics 29, 73-100. 
Ali, A. a nd S. Kallapur, 2001, Securities price consequences of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 and related events, The Accounting Review 76, 431-461. 
Bartov, E., Givoly, D. and C. Hayn, 2002, The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations, 
Journal of Accounting Economics 33, 173-204. 
Black, F. and M. Scholes, 1973, The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, Journal of Political 
Economy 81, 637-654. 
Boni, L. and K. L. Womack, 2002, Wall Street’s credibility problem: Misaligned incentives and 
dubious fixes?, Working paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.  
Bowen, R.M., DuCharme, L. and D. Shores, 1995, Stakeholders’ implicit claims and accounting 
method choice, Journal of Accounting and Economics 20, 255-295. 
Brown,  L.D., 2001a, A temporal analysis of earnings surprises: Profit vs. losses, Journal of 
Accounting Research 39, 221-241. 
Brown, L.D., 2001b, Small negative surprises: Frequency and consequence, Working paper, 
Georgia State University. 
Brown, L.D. and H.N. Higgins, 2002, Managers’ guidance of analysts: International evidence, 
Working paper, Georgia State University and Worcester Polytechnic Institute. 
Bushee, B.J., 1998, The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior, The 
Accounting Review 73, 305-333. 
Chan, L.K.C., Karceski, J. and J. Lakonishok, Analysts’ conflict of interest and biases in earnings 
forecasts, 2003, Working paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.   41
Core J.E. and W.R. Guay, 2001, Stock option plans for non-executive employees, Journal of 
Financial Economics 61, 253-287. 
Cotter, J.A., Tuna, I. and P.D. Wysocki, 2002, The expectations management game : Do analysts 
act independently of explicit management earnings guidance?, Working paper, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Crichfield T., Dyckman, T., and J. Lakonishok, 1978, An evaluation of security analysts’ forecasts, 
The Accounting Review 53, 651-668. 
Dechow, P., Sloan, R.G. and A.P. Sweeney, 1995, Detecting earnings management, The 
Accounting Review 70, 193-225. 
Dechow, P., Sloan, R.G. and A.P. Sweeney, 1996, Causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulations: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC, Contemporary 
Accounting Research 13, 1-36. 
Degeorge, F., Patel, J. and R. Zeckhauser, 1999, Earnings management to exceed thresholds, 
Journal of Business 72, 1-33. 
Francis, J., Philbrick, D. and K. Shipper, 1993, Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures, 
Journal of Accounting Research 32, 137-164. 
Fuller, J., and M.C. Jensen, 2002, Just say no to Wall-Street, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
14, 41-46. 
Gao, P. and R.E. Shrieves, 2002, Earnings management and executive compensation: A case of 
overdose of option and underdose of salary?, Working paper, University of Tennessee.  
Heinkel, R. and A. Kraus, 1988, Measuring event impacts on thinly traded stocks, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23, 71-88.   42
Hong, H., Lim, T. and J.C. Stein, 2000, Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage, and the 
profitability of momentum strategies, Journal of Finance 55, 265-295. 
Hotchkiss, E.S. and D. Strickland, 2003, Does shareholder composition matter? Evidence from the 
market reaction to corporate earnings announcements, Journal of Finance 58, 1469-1498.. 
Imhoff, E.A and G.J. Lobo, 1984, Information content of analysts’ composite forecast revisions, 
Journal of Accounting Research 22, 541-554. 
Jones, J., 1991, Earnings management during import relief investigations, Journal of Accounting 
Research 29, 193-229. 
Kasznik, R. and M.F. McNichols, 2002, Does meeting expectations matter? Evidence from analyst 
forecast revisions and share prices, Journal of Accounting Research 40, 727-759. 
Kennedy, P., 2000, A guide to econometrics, Blackwell publisher, 4
th edition.  
Lin, H. and M.F. McNichols, 1998, Underwriting relationships, analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
investment recommendations, Journal of Accounting and Economics 25, 101-127. 
Lim, T., 2001, Rationality and analysts’ forecast bias, Journal of Finance 56, 369-385. 
Liu, M.H. and T. Yao, 2003, The consensus-beating game, Working paper, Boston College and 
University of Arizona. 
Lopez, T.J. and L. Rees, 2001, The effect of meeting analyst forecasts and systematic positive 
forecast errors on the information content of unexpected earnings, Working paper, Texas A&M 
University.  
Matsumoto, D.A., 2002, Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises, The 
Accounting Review 77, 483-514. 
Matsunaga, S.R. and C.W. Park, 2001, The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the 
CEO’s annual bonus, The Accounting Review 76, 313-332.   43
Merton, R., 1973, Theory of rational option pricing, Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 4, 141-183. 
Michaely, R., Womack, K.L., 1999, Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst 
recommendations. The Review of Financial Studies 12, 653-686. 
Murphy, K.J., 1999, Executive compensation, In Handbook of labor economics, edited by 
Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card. 
Ofek, E. and D. Yermack, 2000, Taking stock: Equity-based compensation and the evolution of 
managerial ownership, Journal of Finance 55, 1367-1384. 
Puffer, S.M. and J.B. Weintrop, 1991, Corporate performance and CEO turnover: The role of 
performance expectations, Administrative Science Quarterly 36, 1-19. 
Richardson, S.A., Teoh, S.H. and P.D. Wysocki, 2003, The walk-down to beatable analyst 
forecasts: The role of equity issuance and insider trading incentives, Working paper, University of 
Pennsylvania, Ohio State University, and MIT Sloan School of Management. 
Sivakumar, K., and G. Waymire, 1994, Insider trading following material news events: evidence 
from earnings, Financial Management 23, 23-32. 
Soffer, L., Thiagarajan, R. and B. Walther, 2002, Earnings preannouncement strategies, Review of 
Accounting Studies 5, 5-26.  
Skinner, D.J. and R.G. Sloan, 2002, Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or 
don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio, Review of Accounting Studies 7, 289-312.  
Yermack, D., 1995, Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?, Journal of Financial 
Economics 39, 237-269. 
Yermack, D., 1997, Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements, 
Journal of Finance 52, 449-476.   44
White, H., 1980, A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for 
heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838.  45
Table 1 
Summary statistics for the expectations management proxy construction 
 
             
      Average       
  Mean  Std. dev.  t-stat.  Q1  Median  Q3 
             
a   0.024  0.074  0.796  -0.002  0.023  0.037 
1 b   0.046  0.409  0.252  -0.100  0.039  0.161 
2 b   0.153  0.167  2.287  0.083  0.112  0.164 
Adj. 
2 R   0.187  0.190  n.a.  0.085  0.157  0.244 
             
 
Reported average parameter estimates, standard deviations, and average t-statistics from the regression of 
changes in EPS on past changes in EPS and cumulative excess stock returns. The regression is estimated 
each year using data for all firms in the same industries, grouped as in Yermack (1995). Altogether 196 
regressions are performed for a maximum of 22 different industry groups from 1992 to 2000.  
.  46
Table 2 
Summary statistics for CEO compensation components 
   Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
                        
RSG  308.45 7086.57 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 650812.05
SHARE  2611.07 25976.39 0.00 106.03 236.71  539.70 1318976.32
INMONEX  8878.89 44889.17 0.00 192.48 1014.03  2977.11 1959915.45
OPTSENS  44.46 188.15 0.00 3.28 10.52  22.77 9993.09
BONUS  531.23 938.88 0.00 150.00 300.00  500.00 43511.53
LTIP  135.18 685.66 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 16092.70
SALARY  575.14 309.53 0.00 405.00 518.11  650.00 3649.13
 
SHARE is the market value of firm shares held by CEOs at the end of a given fiscal year. RSG is the value of 
restricted shares awarded to CEOs in a given fiscal year. INMONEX is the value of in-the-money exercisable options 
held by CEOs at the end of the fiscal year. Option sensitivity (OPTSENS) is the dollar amount of option value change 
(options granted during the current fiscal year) if the underlying stock price moves up 1%. BONUS denotes the annual 
bonus paid to CEOs. LTIP is the sum paid to CEOs in a given fiscal year according to the long-term incentive plan. 
SALARY is the annual base salary paid to CEOs. All variables are expressed in thousands of dollars. The total number 
of observations is 8’714.   47
Table 3 
Summary statistics for control variables 
  Mean  Std. dev.   Min    T1    Median     T2   Max 
               
LOSS  0.080 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
INCEPS  0.669 0.471 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MEET   0.706 0.456 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
RCOV   0.000 0.454 -1.729 -0.180 0.021 0.212 1.330
IFE   0.023 0.059 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.016 3.012
EARNRET  5.459 2.427 1.000 4.000 5.000 7.000 10.000
LTG  0.175 0.087 -0.250 0.129 0.150 0.186 1.250
LABOR  0.565 0.221 0.024 0.481 0.592 0.689 0.995
DUR  0.417 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
R&D  0.036 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.028 1.464
ICLAIM  0.000 1.000 -1.720 -0.560 -0.099 0.521 10.241
LIT   0.355 0.478 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
TRAN  0.049 0.059 0.000 0.017 0.032 0.050 0.538
              
 
LOSS is an indicator variable which equals one if a loss is reported in the current fiscal year. Increasing EPS INCEPS is 
an indicator variable that equals one if reported EPS exceed the previous year’s EPS. MEET is an indicator variable 
which equals one if reported earnings meet or beat the last consensus estimate prior to the announcement. Residual 
analyst coverage RCOV is the residual from a regression of the log of one plus the number of analysts contributing to 
the last consensus estimate prior to the announcement on the log market value of the company at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. Initial forecast error IFE is the absolute value of the difference between the first consensus estimate in the 
fiscal year and reported EPS, scaled by share price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Returns on earnings EARNRET is 
the decile rank from industry specific regressions of cumulative excess returns on yearly changes in earnings. Long-term 
growth  LTG  is the first consensus long-term earnings growth forecast estimate in the fiscal year. Labor intensity 
LABOR is defined as one minus the ratio of gross property, plant, and equipment to total gross assets. DUR is a dummy 
variable indicating membership in durable goods industries (SIC codes 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283, 301, 324-399). 
R&D is annual research expenses divided by total assets. Missing values for R&D are set to zero. ICLAIM is the score of 
the factor analysis combining LABOR, DUR, and R&D into a single variable measuring reliance on implicit claims. LIT 
is a dummy variable indicating membership in litigious industries (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-
5961, 7370-7374). Transient institutional investors TRAN measures the percentage of a firm’s shares held by transient 
institutional investors. This variable is constructed as in Bushee (1998). The total number of observations is 8’714.   48
Table 4 




OPTSENS BONUS LTIP SALARY LOSS INCEPS  MEET RCOV IFE
EARNRE
T 
LTG ICLAIM LIT TRAN 
DOWN    0.008 -0.013 0.110 0.097 0.056 0.033 0.034 0.010 -0.093  0.043 -0.031 -0.048 -0.096  -0.005 0.078 0.005 -0.002 
RSG      -0.120 0.052 0.127 0.178 0.038 0.211 -0.023 0.021  0.004 -0.014 -0.033 -0.017  -0.144 -0.055 -0.089 -0.037 
SHARE        -0.027 -0.140 -0.122 -0.121 -0.121 -0.040 0.034  0.024 -0.008 -0.053 0.044  0.274 0.009 0.090 -0.002 
INMONEX          0.453 0.400 0.152 0.292 -0.150 0.233  0.103 0.079 -0.257 -0.050  0.151 0.138 0.124 0.068 
OPTSENS            0.357 0.127 0.352 -0.077 0.085  0.075 0.066 -0.131 -0.069  0.062 0.125 0.110 -0.007 
BONUS              0.234 0.521 -0.232 0.331  0.114 0.039 -0.282 -0.044  -0.187 -0.019 -0.102 0.062 
LTIP                0.261 -0.071 0.051  0.012 -0.034 -0.086 -0.046  -0.202 -0.043 -0.105 -0.028 
SALARY                  -0.116 0.019  0.042 -0.002 -0.095 -0.004  -0.344 -0.153 -0.111 -0.055 
LOSS                    -0.281  -0.153 -0.031 0.353 -0.006  0.065 0.143 0.095 -0.085 
INCEPS                      0.189 0.121 -0.511 -0.027  0.052 0.009 0.027 0.211 
MEET                        0.051 -0.139 0.002  0.053 0.024 0.038 0.044 
RCOV                          -0.027 0.052  0.104 -0.085 0.095 0.217 
IFE                            0.030  -0.063 -0.010 -0.023 -0.052 
EARNRET                              0.025 -0.157 0.086 0.047 
LTG                                0.327 0.411 0.062 
ICLAIM                                   0.277 0.067 
LIT                                    0.057 
 
Summary of the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression analysis. RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, BONUS, LTIP, SALARY, IFE, LTG and TRAN are measured as the 
values of their cumulative distribution functions. The other variables are measured as described in Table 3. The total number of observations is 8’714. Bold figures denote significance at the 1% 
level. Figures in italic denote significance at the 5% level.    49
 
Table 5 
The relation between downward guidance, CEO compensation components, 
 and other firm characteristic control variables 
Endogenous variable: DOWN 
 
Variable  Predicted sign  Coefficient  p-value  Marginal 
Effect 
         
SHARE  +  0.328  0.0241  0.060 
RSG  +  -0.478  0.7800  -0.088 
INMONEX  +  0.805  0.0000  0.148 
OPTSENS  +  0.415  0.0008  0.076 
BONUS  +  0.517  0.0001  0.095 
LTIP  +  0.879  0.1789  0.162 
SALARY  -  -0.583  0.0000  -0.107 
LOSS  +/-  0.294  0.0065  0.051 
INCEPS  +/-  -1.052  0.0000  -0.175 
MEET  +/-  0.319  0.0000  0.061 
RCOV  +  0.018  0.3930  -0.003 
IFE  -  -1.023  0.0000  -0.188 
EARNRET  +  -0.035  0.9977  -0.006 
LTG  +  -0.473  0.9999  -0.087 
ICLAIM  +  -0.089  0.9580  -0.016 
LIT  +  -0.093  0.7980  -0.017 
TRAN  +  0.600  0.0000  0.110 
         
Chi2(46)  1’127.82    N  8’714 
Prob > chi2  0.0000    Pseudo R2  0.1394 
 
Pooled logit regression estimates o f  DOWN on compensation variables and other firm 
characteristics; year and industry effects are included but not reported. All exogenous variables are 
defined in Table 2 and Table 3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, 
IFE, LTG, and TRAN are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution 
functions.  p-values are computed with robust standard errors and correspond to one-sided 
hypothesis tests. If no prediction is made (+/-), the p-values are given for two-sided tests. 
Marginal effects are computed as 
2 /(1)
XX ee
bb ¢¢ + , evaluated at the means of the elements of X. 
The chi2 statistic and the corresponding p-value are given for the joint test of significance of the 
model coefficients. N is the number of firm-year observations. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s measure 
of goodness of fit, computed as 1(/) uc LL - , where  u L denotes the unconstrained Log-Likelihood 
of the (full) model and  c L denotes the constrained Log-Likelihood of the constrained (intercept 
only) model. 
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Table 6 
Fixed and random effects estimations of the relation between downward guidance, 
CEO compensation components, and other firm characteristic control variables 






Conditional logit (fixed effects) and random effects probit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables; year effects are included but not 
reported. Industry effects (not reported) are only jointly significant in the random effects specification and are dropped in the fixed effects 
estimation. Chi2 is Chi2(25) for fixed effects and Chi2(45) for the random effects specification. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 
and Table 3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, LTG, and TRAN are expressed in terms of the values assigned 





Coeff.  p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
  Coeff.  p-value  Marginal 
Effect 
                   
SHARE  +    0.304 0.1873  0.061    0.186  0.0277  0.059 
RSG  +    -0.483 0.7182  -0.107    -0.250  0.7422  -0.079 
INMONEX  +    1.472 0.0000  0.318    0.466  0.0000  0.148 
OPTSENS  +    0.565 0.0003  0.235    0.254  0.0005  0.080 
LTIP  +    0.708 0.3269  0.218    0.541  0.1804  0.171 
BONUS  +    0.481 0.0056  0.108    0.298  0.0001  0.094 
SALARY  -    -0.601 0.0164  -0.140    -0.340  0.0000  -0.108 
LOSS  +/-    0.888 0.0000  0.205    0.177  0.0065  0.053 
INCEPS  +/-    -1.056 0.0000  -0.254    -0.617  0.0000  -0.180 
MEET  +/-    0.295 0.0000  0.075    0.183  0.0000  0.059 
RCOV  +    0.217 0.0268  0.047    0.014  0.3630  0.004 
IFE  -    -0.290 0.0225  -0.069    -0.608  0.0000  -0.193 
EARNRET  +    -0.039 0.9991  -0.010    -0.018  0.9952  -0.006 
LTG  +    -1.001 1.0000  -0.251    -0.283  1.0000  -0.090 
ICLAIM  +    0.198 0.0758  0.050    -0.052  0.9668  -0.016 
LIT  +    -0.189 0.6941  -0.039    -0.054  0.7976  -0.017 
TRAN  +    0.737 0.0000  0.176    0.346  0.0000  0.110 
                 
Chi2          1’120.14        1’250.07 
Prob > chi2          0.0000        0.0000 
N        7’548        8’714 
Pseudo R2        0.1834        0.1397   51
Table 7 
 Panel A: Conditioning on reaching behavioral thresholds  
The relation between downward guidance, CEO compensation components, and other firm characteristic control variables 
Endogenous variable: DOWN   profit reporting firms                                       firms with increasing EPS            firms that meet or beat analyst forecast 
Variable  Pred. 
sign 
Coeff.  p-value  Marginal 
Effect 
  Coeff.  p-value  Marginal 
Effect 
  Coeff.  p-value  Marginal 
Effect 
                         
SHARE  +  0.307 0.0366  0.057  0.496  0.0062  0.099  0.520  0.0044  0.093
RSG  +  -0.568 0.8166  -0.105  -0.095  0.5483  -0.019  -0.306  0.6665  -0.054
INMONEX  +  0.783 0.0000  0.145  0.907  0.0000  0.181  0.927  0.0000  0.165
OPTSENS  +  0.372 0.0032  0.069  0.440  0.0023  0.088  0.409  0.0042  0.073
BONUS  +  0.501 0.0002  0.093  0.616  0.0001  0.123  0.556  0.0003  0.099
LTIP  +  1.055 0.1392  0.195  1.014  0.1675  0.202  1.473  0.1056  0.262
SALARY  -  -0.627 0.0000  -0.116  -0.793  0.0000  -0.158  -0.791  0.0000  -0.141
LOSS  +/-      -0.796  0.0003  -0.181  0.580  0.0006  0.089
INCEPS  +/-  -0.889 0.0000  -0.149        -0.977  0.0000  -0.153
MEET  +/-  0.257 0.0000  0.049  0.273  0.0002  0.056     
RCOV  +  -0.015 0.7245  -0.003  -0.068  0.7918  -0.014  0.005  0.4776  0.001
IFE  -  -0.932 0.0000  -0.172  -1.238  0.0000  -0.247  -0.742  0.0000  -0.132
EARNRET  +  -0.039 0.9990  -0.007  -0.038  0.9957  -0.008  -0.028  0.9713  -0.005
LTG  +  -0.503 0.9999  -0.093  -0.282  0.9684  -0.056  -0.523  0.9996  -0.093
ICLAIM  +  -0.009 0.5611  -0.002  0.018  0.3880  0.004  -0.075  0.8730  -0.013
LIT  +  -0.100 0.8018  -0.019  -0.055  0.6626  -0.011  -0.170  0.8985  -0.031
TRAN  +  0.561 0.0000  0.104    0.790  0.0000  0.158  0.638  0.0000  0.114
                 
Wald chi2(45)      1’014.10      794.84      723.02
Prob >chi2      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000
N      8’018      5’832      6’153
Pseudo R2      0.1350      0.1428      0.1276
 
Pooled logit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables except for the three threshold variables on which the regressions are conditioned; year and industry effects are included but not 
reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, LTG, and TRAN are expressed in terms of the 
values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5.    52
Table 7 
Panel B: Conditioning on missing behavioral thresholds.  
The relation between downward guidance, CEO compensation components, and other firm characteristic control variables 
Endogenous variable: DOWN        loss reporting firms                                       firms with decreasing EPS                   firms that miss analyst forecast 
Variable 
Pred. 
sign  Coeff.  p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
  Coeff.  p-value  Marginal 
Effect 
  Coeff.  p-value  Marginal 
Effect 
                         
SHARE  +  -0.830 0.8482  -0.115  -0.436  0.9133  -0.060  -0.230  0.7707  -0.044
RSG  +  4.129 0.1449  0.571  -0.898  0.7956  -0.123  -0.798  0.7313  -0.155
INMONEX  +  1.340 0.0226  0.185  0.780  0.0018  0.107  0.457  0.0374  0.088
OPTSENS  +  1.793 0.0016  0.248  0.150  0.2871  0.021  0.530  0.0207  0.103
BONUS  +  0.074 0.4579  0.010  0.456  0.0430  0.063  0.284  0.1415  0.055
LTIP  +  -8.255 0.8281  -1.142  0.026  0.4958  0.004  -1.403  0.7471  -0.272
SALARY  -  0.301 0.7101  0.042  -0.249  0.1344  -0.034  -0.063  0.3881  -0.012
LOSS  +/-      0.522  0.0006  0.064  0.135  0.3808  0.026
INCEPS  +/-  -3.014 0.0000  -0.583        -1.313  0.0000  -0.247
MEET  +/-  0.959 0.0001  0.131  0.378  0.0003  0.053     
RCOV  +  0.253 0.1373  0.035  0.235  0.0269  0.032  -0.018  0.5600  -0.004
IFE  -  -0.642 0.2005  -0.089  0.538  0.9830  0.074  -1.912  0.0000  -0.371
EARNRET  +  -0.027 0.6664  -0.004  -0.041  0.9471  -0.006  -0.049  0.9816  -0.009
LTG  +  -0.329 0.7948  -0.046  -1.278  1.0000  -0.175  -0.405  0.9715  -0.078
ICLAIM  +  -0.148 0.8295  -0.021  -0.171  0.9757  -0.023  -0.118  0.8961  -0.023
LIT  +  -0.464 0.8266  -0.064  -0.350  0.9364  -0.050  0.101  0.3090  0.019
TRAN  +  0.648 0.0898  0.090    0.153  0.2687  0.021  0.410  0.0341  0.079
                 
Wald chi2(45)      182.51      427.58      428.67
Prob >chi2      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000
N      696      2’882      2’561
Pseudo R2      0.3501      0.1943      0.1881
 
Pooled logit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables except for the three threshold variables on which the regressions are conditioned; year and industry effects are included but not 
reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3. SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, LTG, and TRAN are expressed in terms of the 
values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5.   53
 
Table 8 
The relation between marginally beating consensus forecast,  
CEO compensation components, and other firm characteristic control variables 
Endogenous variable: BEAT 
 
Variable  Predicted sign  Coefficient  p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
         
SHARE  +  0.357  0.0065  0.085 
RSG  +  -0.769  0.9055  -0.183 
INMONEX  +  0.238  0.0163  0.057 
OPTSENS  +  0.124  0.1376  0.030 
BONUS  +  0.158  0.0930  0.038 
LTIP  +  -1.284  0.9194  -0.306 
SALARY  -  -0.158  0.0731  -0.038 
LOSS  +/-  -0.862  0.0000  -0.183 
INCEPS  +/-  0.352  0.0000  0.083 
RCOV  +  0.392  0.0000  0.093 
IFE  -  -0.750  0.0000  -0.179 
EARNRET  +  -0.007  0.7292  -0.002 
LTG  +  0.456  0.0000  0.109 
ICLAIM  +  0.015  0.3585  0.004 
LIT  +  0.032  0.3673  0.008 
TRAN  +  0.239  0.0120  0.057 
         
Wald chi2(45)  652.46    N  8'714 
Prob > chi2  0.0000    Pseudo R2  0.0644 
 
Pooled logit regression results of  BEAT on all explanatory variables.  BEAT equals one if 
announced EPS exceed the consensus forecast by no more than 5 cents. Year effects are included 
but not reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3. SALARY, BONUS, 
LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, LTG, and TRAN are expressed in terms of the 
values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in 
Table 5.  
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Table 9 
Cumulative abnormal returns at announcement date  
           
  Earnings surprise   
     
  Zero or     
  Positive  Negative  Difference 
           
CAR  0.013 -0.015 0.028
(p-value)  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
N  6’119 2’544 8’663
      
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 8’663 firm-year observations around 
the earnings announcement dates between 1993 and 2001. CARs are estimated 
with a market model type regression over 252 days, ending two days after the 
earnings announcement using a WLS regression as in Heinkel and Krauss (1998). 
The event window ranges from two days preceding the earnings announcement 
to two days after this date. Companies’ cumulative abnormal returns are 
classified into two distinct categories according to the sign of their earnings 
surprise. The earnings surprise is computed as the difference between the released 
EPS and the last consensus issued by analysts for a particular firm in a given 
year.   55
Table 10 
Market anticipation of expectations management at announcement date 
 
 
              
Earnings  Expectations    CAR  Difference 
surprise  management  N  (p-value)  (p-value) 
              
Zero or  Suspected 
Positive  (DOWN=1) 
4'489  0.010  




1'630  0.020 -0.009
      (<0.01) (<0.01)




1'758  -0.016 




786  -0.011 -0.005
      (<0.01) (0.2215)
              
 
Cumulative abnormal returns ( CAR) for 8’663 firm-year observations around the earnings 
announcement dates between 1993 and 2001. CARs are estimated with a market model type 
regression over 252 days ending two days after the earnings announcement with a WLS regression as 
in Heinkel and Krauss (1998). The event window ranges from two days preceding the earnings 
announcement to two days after this date. Companies’ cumulative abnormal returns are classified into 
four distinct categories according to whether their earnings surprise is positive or strictly negative and 
whether expectations management can be suspected. Earnings surprise is computed as the difference 
between the announced EPS and the last consensus issued by analysts for a particular firm in a given 
year. A given company is suspected of managing expectations if  [] FEPSEFEPS < .  [] EFEPS  is 
computed as described in section 4.   56
Table 11 
Explaining the reduced abnormal returns for firms suspected of managing earnings 
       
  Coefficient  t-stat.  (p-value) 
   
Intercept  -0.000 -0.033 0.9738 
SHARE  0.003 0.509 0.6109 
INMONEX  -0.012 -2.731 0.0063 
INST  0.003 0.624 0.5326 
       
N  6119   
Adj. 
2 R   0.69%    
F test  2.229   
(p-value)  <0.01   
       
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts are regressed on 
CEO compensation components and firm-specific control variables, which are partially or 
entirely known by the market at the earnings announcement dates. CARs are estimated with a 
market model type regression over 250 days ending two days after the event date with a WLS 
regression as in Heinkel and Krauss (1998). The event window ranges from two days preceding 
the earnings announcement date to two days after this date. INST is the percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors at the end of the fiscal year. Other variables are defined as above. 
SHARE,  INMONEX, INST and MCAP are expressed  in terms of the values assigned by their 
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Whole sample DOWN=1 DOWN=0
 
The average forecast error is computed as the mean of all analyst forecasts of EPS in month t preceding the announcement minus announced EPS . This difference is scaled by 
stock price at the prior fiscal year end. Month -11 is the first and month 0 is the last month of the forecasting period. The solid line shows the average scaled forecast error for the 
entire sample of observations. The dashed line displays the average scaled forecast error for firms suspected of managing expectations downward (DOWN=1) and the dotted line 
depicts the average forecast error for firms that are not suspected of managing expectations downward (DOWN=0). The FAME Research Paper Series 
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